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The present study sought to determine whether social knowledge such as speaker occu-
pation stereotypes may impact theory of mind (ToM) ability in patients with schizophrenia 
(SZ). Thirty individuals with SZ and 30 matched healthy control (HC) participants were 
tested individually on their ToM ability using a paradigm showing that stereotypes such 
as speaker occupation influences the extent to which speaker ironic intent is understood. 
ToM ability was assessed with open questions on the speaker ironic intent, irony rating, 
and mockery rating. Social perception was also assessed through politeness rating. 
The main results showed that SZ participants, like HC participants, were sensitive to the 
social stereotypes. They used these stereotypes adequately to attribute mental states 
such as speaker ironic intent to a protagonist while they found it difficult to explicitly 
judge and attribute negative attitude and emotion, as evidenced by mockery rating. No 
difference was found between the two groups regarding social perception ability. These 
performances were not associated with clinical symptoms. The integration of contextual 
information seems to be a good target for cognitive remediation aiming to increase social 
cognition ability.
Keywords: theory of mind, ironic intent, social knowledge, context, stereotypes, social perception, schizophrenia
introduction
A deficit in social cognition – including theory of mind (ToM), emotion processing, social perception, 
and attributional bias – is one of the most disabling clinical characteristics of schizophrenia (SZ) (1). 
For this reason, social cognition has become a high priority domain of research for the study of SZ (2). 
It has been included as one of the seven domains represented in the MATRICS Consensus Cognitive 
Battery for clinical trials in SZ (2). In addition, results from recent meta-analysis and literature review 
have pointed out that there are strong correlations between social cognition and outcome, underly-
ing that these correlations were strongest with ToM and, to a lesser degree, with social perception 
(1, 3). Thus, given the prominence of the impairments in social functioning in SZ, it is important to 
understand the cognitive processes underlying impaired social cognition in this disorder. This paper 
focuses on two aspects of social cognition, namely ToM and social perception, and particularly on 
the impact of social contextual information on ToM abilities in SZ.
Theory of mind is the ability to form representations of other people’s mental states (e.g., intention, 
thought, belief) and to use these representations to understand, predict, and judge their statements 
and behaviors (4, 5). A number of studies have reported impaired ToM ability in patients with 
SZ [see Ref. (6–9) for a review] assessed in natural communication situations (10, 11) and also 
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in tasks assessing first- and second-order false beliefs (12–15), 
irony comprehension (16–21), hinting comprehension (22–24), 
and picture-sequencing tasks (25, 26). This ToM impairment in SZ 
patients has been supposed to result from their inability to process 
contextual information (27–31). But research investigating this 
hypothesis in SZ has only used non-social contextual information 
using different kinds of visual and verbal tasks (27, 32). In line 
with the findings of Uhlhaas et al. (32) and Green et al. (29, 30), 
Champagne-Lavau et al. (21) showed that participants with SZ cor-
rectly perceived contextual information, but they showed difficulty 
in correctly integrating this information, performing significantly 
worse than healthy participants when attributing mental states.
Few studies (33) have dealt with the role of social knowledge in 
ToM ability. However, social knowledge is also a kind of contextual 
information that contributes to the attribution of mental states to 
others (34). Social knowledge refers “to awareness of the roles, 
rules, and goals that characterize social situations and guide social 
interactions” [(35): p. 1212, Ref. (1, 33, 36)].
To our knowledge, only the work by Corrigan and Penn and 
their colleagues (see below) directly investigated the processing of 
social knowledge and social perception in SZ. Social perception 
refers to the ability to identify social cues from the behavior of 
others in a given social context. Tasks used to investigate social 
perception abilities generally assess the ability of a person to 
identify social roles, social context, and rules of a society (37, 38). 
They require to process social cues which can be concrete (i.e., 
actions, roles, and dialogs explicitly displayed by the protagonists) 
or abstract (i.e., knowledge inferred from action and dialog of 
the protagonists such as affects, rules, and goals) [(39, 40), see 
Ref. (41) for examples]. The authors found that, compared to 
healthy participants, individuals with SZ were impaired in social 
perception (42). These disorders have been related to a difficulty in 
processing the social context (38). Thus, because of their difficul-
ties in identifying social information, individuals with SZ would 
have difficulties in recognizing the rules and social conventions 
associated with a given situation (41, 43). These difficulties would 
rather concern the abstract social cues than the concrete ones (39, 
43). Moreover, these difficulties would be relatively independent 
of the symptomatology (38).
The present study investigated whether social knowledge, which 
is a kind of social contextual information, impacts the attribu-
tion of mental states to others. Irony understanding is a relevant 
paradigm to assess this issue in SZ, since social knowledge such as 
speaker occupation stereotypes is contextual information that has 
been found to influence the attribution of speaker intent (ToM) in 
healthy individuals (44). Stereotypes are knowledge people have 
on other people as members of a group (34, 45). They are stored in 
memory, processed and activated automatically and unconsciously 
(45, 46). They were shown to be present even in people with limited 
social experience and in people with impaired social behavior such 
as children with autism (47).
Regarding irony processing, it has been demonstrated that, 
among several factors (e.g., level of incongruity between context 
and speaker’s utterance, prosody), speaker features (e.g., his/
her social status or his/her occupation) influence the extent to 
which ironic intent is perceived among healthy subjects (44, 
48–50). More precisely, Katz and Pexman (50) pointed out that 
people perceive members of certain occupations as likely to 
use irony while members of other occupations are perceived 
as unlikely to use irony. For example, one is more likely to 
interpret a statement as ironic and mocking if it is said by an 
actor rather than a clergyman (44, 50). According to Pexman 
and Olineck (44), “the occupation stereotype contributes to 
the ironic environment by indicating that the speaker is likely 
to have a negative attitude (tendency to be critical) and that 
such an attitude is likely to be indirectly expressed (through 
humor and insincerity)” (page 268). These authors also reported 
that saying something negative in an ironic way (i.e., “you are 
a wonderful singer” in a context where you sang and people 
started to throw things at you) is perceived as more polite 
than saying something in a direct way (i.e., “you are a horrible 
singer”). Thus, assessing the degree of perceived politeness is a 
way to assess social perception.
These findings related to social knowledge and social percep-
tion were used in the present study to determine whether social 
knowledge influences the attribution of intention by patients 
with SZ. As far as we know, no research investigating ToM ability 
via irony comprehension in SZ has assessed the impact of social 
knowledge on such ability. Accordingly, the present study aimed at 
determining whether social knowledge such as stereotypes (type of 
speaker’s occupation) – which has been demonstrated to be social 
factors that cue speaker ironic intent in healthy individuals – also 
cues comprehension of ironic intent in SZ. It also aimed at assess-
ing social perception in SZ participants. To these aims, we used a 
task of irony understanding manipulating contextual information 
according to the presence of a speaker occupation cueing or not 
ironic intent. Based on previous results, we hypothesized that 
difficulty in using social contextual data that cue speaker ironic 
intent will have an impact on the ToM ability of SZ participants.
Materials and Methods
Participants
The sample consisted of 60 participants: 30 individuals with SZ and 
30 healthy control (HC) participants with no history of psychiatric 
disorders. SZ patients were diagnosed by clinicians according to 
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. All SZ participants were outpatients 
who had been recruited from the pavillon Albert prévost of the 
Hôpital du Sacré-Coeur of Montréal. They were stable and on 
antipsychotic medication with a normal recommended range of 
dosage (the average chlorpromazine equivalent was 642 ± 651 mg/
day). The severity of symptoms was measured using the Positive 
and Negative Symptom Scale [PANSS; (51)]. HC participants had 
been recruited in the local community. They were matched with 
the SZ patients for age and educational level (cf. Table 1 for the 
demographic data). The two groups did not significantly differ 
with regard to age [t(58) = −0.94, p >  0.05], educational level 
[t(58) = −0.65, p > 0.05], and IQ estimated using the NART (52) 
[t(58) = −0.74, p > 0.05]. All participants were native French-
speakers with no previous neurological history.
Written consent forms were obtained from all participants, 
according to ethics guidelines set out by the University of Montreal 
and the Hôpital du Sacré-Coeur de Montréal.
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Measures
A task of irony understanding was used to test the attribution 
of intention. The stimuli were composed of 48 stories from 
Champagne-Lavau et  al. (21) controlled for familiarity and 
plausibility. To assess how social knowledge, such as occupation 
stereotypes, influenced participants’ ToM ability, the context was 
manipulated according to the presence of an occupation cueing 
or not ironic intent (cf. Supplementary Material, for example). 
Following Pexman and Olineck (44), a no occupation condition 
was also devised to create filler stimuli. This condition, in which 
the speakers were identified by their first names, was included to 
prevent the participants from developing response strategy that 
would help them foresee job information. The speaker occupations 
were chosen following a pilot study conducted with the procedure 
used by Pexman and Olineck (44). Forty undergraduate students 
from the University of Montreal were recruited for this pilot study. 
For each occupation, they were asked to imagine that a member of 
that occupation got a flat tire on the way to work. They were then 
asked to rate, on a 7-point scale (1 = low probability, 7 = high prob-
ability), the likelihood that the member of this occupation would 
make an ironic remark about the situation. Forty five occupations 
were tested in that pilot study. The following eight occupations were 
judged as having the highest probability (p > 4.50) of ironic remarks 
(“sarcastic occupations”): comedian, talk show host, actress, artist, 
movie critic, mechanic, plumber, and insurance agent (M = 4.91, 
SD = 0.43). The following eight occupations were judged as having 
the lowest probability (p < 3.50) of ironic remarks (“non-sarcastic 
occupations”): accountant, clergyman, scientist, librarian, soldier, 
waiter, bank teller, and veterinarian (M = 2.78, SD = 0.30). These two 
occupation conditions were significantly different [t(14) = 11.49; 
p < 0.0001]. The stories ended either with a literal statement (e.g., 
Marie has a poor memory) or with an ironic statement (e.g., Marie 
has a phenomenal memory) to prevent judgments at chance level. 
Thus, the materials for the experiment were 48 stories involving 
a 2 statements (ironic or literal) by 3 occupations (occupation 
that cues ironic intent, occupation that does not cue ironic intent, 
and no occupation) combination of conditions (cf. Supplementary 
Material, for example). The stories were presented in random order. 
To control for prosody, stimuli were presented on a sheet of paper. 
Each stimulus was placed in front of the participant and remained 
there throughout the reading and questioning so that participants 
did not have to remember it. This was done in order to minimize 
memory and attention requirements.
Table 1 | Demographic and clinical data.
schizophrenia healthy control p-value
Mean sD Mean sD
Age 43.9 8.3 41.7 9.6 0.94
Educational level 12.8 1.9 13.2 2.4 0.80
Gender (male/
female)
(17/13) (10/20)
Duration of illness 17.3 8.9
PANSS (positive) 16.3 5.8
PANSS (negative) 15.8 6.3
PANSS (general) 33.4 10.2
NART 37.7 7 35.9 5.5 0.54
In line with the study by Pexman and Olineck (44), participants 
were asked to read each of these 48 stimuli and then answer the 
following question: “What does X (the speaker) really mean?” 
Then, they had to judge on a 7-point scale if the speaker was 
being ironic (1 = not at all ironic, 7 = extremely ironic), if he/
she was mocking someone (1 = not at all mocking, 7 = extremely 
mocking), and if he/she was saying something polite (1 = not at all 
polite, 7 = extremely polite). Rating scales on irony and mockery 
were used to assess attribution of speaker intent while the question 
on politeness was used to assess social perception.
All participants were tested individually over one session in a 
quiet room.
Data analysis
The data were analyzed using 2 groups (SZ, HC) × 2 statements 
(ironic, literal) × 2 speaker occupations (sarcastic, non-sarcastic) 
repeated-measures ANOVA. A Spearman correlation analysis 
was conducted on the performances (i.e., percentage of correct 
responses to the question on the speaker iconic intent, irony rating 
scale, mocking rating scale, politeness rating scale) of the SZ group 
for each condition to examine the relationship between ToM and 
symptoms. The alpha level was set at p < 0.05 for all the analyses.
results
group comparison on Theory of Mind
Percentage of Correct Responses to the Open 
Question
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the percentage of correct responses 
to the questions on the speaker intent revealed a significant 
main effect of group [F(1, 58) = 6.52, p < 0.01], showing that SZ 
patients (71.9%) made more errors than HC participants (81.94%). 
There was a significant main effect of speaker occupation [F(1, 
58) = 21.81, p < 0.0001]. The percentage of correct responses was 
higher when the speaker had a sarcastic occupation than when 
he/she had a non-sarcastic occupation. There was also a significant 
main effect of statement [F(1,58) = 58.58, p < 0.0001] showing a 
higher percentage of correct responses for the literal statements 
than for the ironic ones. The speaker occupation ×  statement 
interaction was significant [F(1,58) = 17.12, p < 0.001] reveal-
ing that, for ironic statements, irony ratings were higher when 
the speaker had a sarcastic occupation than when he/she had a 
non-sarcastic occupation (p < 0.0001) whatever the group, while 
for literal statements such difference did not exist (p > 0.05). The 
group × speaker occupation × statement [F(1,58) = 1.59, p > 0.05], 
the group × statement [F(1,58) = 1.54, p > 0.05], and the speaker 
occupation ×  statement interactions [F(1,58) = 0.87, p > 0.05] 
were not significant (cf. Figure 1).
Rating Scales
Irony rating
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the ratings of the extent to which the 
speaker was ironic revealed a significant main effect of speaker 
occupation [F(1, 58) = 9.20, p < 0.01]. Irony ratings were higher 
when the speaker had a sarcastic occupation than when he/she 
had a non-sarcastic occupation. There was also a significant main 
Figure 2 | level of irony of statement for each type of occupation according to the type of participant.
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effect of statement [F(1,58) = 196.46, p < 0.0001] showing that 
irony ratings were higher when the statement was ironic than when 
it was literal. There was no main effect of group [F(1, 58) = 1.52, 
p > 0.05]. The group × speaker occupation × statement interaction 
was not significant [F(1, 58) = 0.02, p > 0.05]. The speaker occu-
pation × statement interaction was significant [F(1, 58) = 14.71, 
p < 0.0001], showing that, for ironic statements, irony ratings were 
higher when the speaker had a sarcastic occupation than when 
he/she had a non-sarcastic occupation (p < 0.0003) whatever the 
group, while for literal statements such difference did not exist 
(p > 0.05). The speaker occupation × group interaction was also 
significant [F(1,58) = 6.62, p < 0.01], revealing that, whatever the 
type of statement, there was no difference between the sarcastic and 
non-sarcastic occupation conditions (p > 0.05) in the SZ group, 
while such difference was present in the HC group (p < 0.001). 
And finally, the group ×  statement interaction was significant 
[F(1,58) = 12.91, p < 0.001]. In both groups, irony ratings were 
higher when the statement was ironic than when it was literal (SZ 
group: p < 0.001; HC group: p < 0.001) (cf. Figure 2).
Figure 1 | Percentage of correct responses to the open question on ironic speaker intent in schizophrenia and healthy control participants.
Mocking rating
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the ratings of the extent to which the 
speaker was mocking someone revealed a main effect of the state-
ment [F(1,58) = 30.70, p < 0.001] showing that mocking ratings 
were higher for the ironic statements than for the literal ones. 
There was a marginal effect of group [F(1,58) = 3.43, p = 0.06] and 
no main effect of speaker occupation [F(1,58) = 2.22, p > 0.05]. 
The speaker occupation × statement interaction was significant 
[respectively F(1, 58) = 12.10, p < 0.001] revealing that, for ironic 
statements, irony ratings were higher when the speaker had a 
sarcastic occupation than when he/she had a non-sarcastic occupa-
tion (p < 0.0001) whatever the group, while for literal statements 
such difference did not exist (p > 0.052). The group × statement 
interaction was significant [F(1,58) = 20.10, p < 0.0001]. In the SZ 
group, the mocking ratings were the same for the literal statements 
and the ironic ones (p > 0.05), while in the HC group, the mocking 
ratings were higher for the ironic statements than for the literal ones 
(p < 0.001), whatever the speaker occupation. The group × speaker 
occupation ×  statement interaction [F(1, 58) = 0.37, p > 0.05] 
Figure 3 | level of mockery of statement for each type of occupation according to the type of participant.
Figure 4 | level of politeness of statement for each type of occupation according to the type of participant.
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and the group × speaker occupation interaction [F(1, 58) = 0.60, 
p > 0.05] were not significant (cf. Figure 3).
To sum up, patients with SZ had lower performances than 
HC participants on the open question on the speaker intent in 
all the conditions. This does not lead to conclude that they have 
any impairment in attributing ironic intent. Using the irony rating 
scales, they showed performances similar to those of HC control 
participants, except they rated the statements in the same way for 
both speaker occupation conditions, whatever the type of statement. 
Surprisingly, SZ patients also judged mockery in the same way in all 
the conditions, meaning they rated both ironic and literal statements 
as much as mocking (around 4), by contrast to HC participants 
who rated ironic statements as more mocking than the literal ones.
group comparison on social Perception
Politeness Rating
The 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVA on the ratings of the extent to which a 
speaker said something polite revealed a significant main effect 
of speaker occupation [F(1, 58) = 19.54, p < 0.0001] showing that 
politeness ratings were higher when the speaker had a non-sarcastic 
occupation than when he/she had a sarcastic occupation. There 
was also a significant main effect of statement [F(1,58) = 98.66, 
p < 0.0001] showing that politeness ratings were higher when the 
statements were ironic than when they were literal. There was no 
main effect of group [F(1,58) = 0.03, p > 0.05]. The group × speaker 
occupation interaction was significant [F(1,58) = 5.77, p < 0.05], 
showing that in the SZ group, the politeness ratings were higher 
when the speaker had a non-sarcastic occupation than when he/
she had a sarcastic occupation (p < 0.0002), while such difference 
did not exist in the HC group (p > 0.05), whatever the type of 
statement. The group × occupation × statement [F(1,58) = 0.16, 
p > 0.05], the group × statement [F(1,58) = 0.03, p > 0.05] and 
the occupation × statement interactions [F(1,58) = 0.32, p > 0.05] 
were not significant (cf. Figure 4).
Association of ToM performances with clinical symptoms
No correlation was found between ToM performances and PANSS 
in the SZ group.
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Discussion
The present study sought to determine whether social knowledge, 
such as speaker occupation stereotypes, may impact ToM ability 
in patients with SZ. We used a psycholinguistic paradigm showing 
that stereotypes, such as speaker occupation, influence the extent 
to which speaker ironic intent is understood. ToM ability was 
assessed with open questions on the speaker ironic intent, irony 
rating, and mockery rating while social perception was assessed 
with politeness rating.
The main results revealed that, like HC participants, SZ 
participants were sensitive to the social stereotypes when they 
judged the statements and when they answered the open question 
on the speaker ironic intent. Indeed both groups found that the 
speaker meant something ironic more often when the speaker had 
a sarcastic occupation than when he had a non-sarcastic occupa-
tion. Interestingly, SZ participants seemed to adequately use these 
stereotypes to cue ironic intent since they did not show specific 
difficulties in attributing ironic intent to the speaker of the stories. 
Indeed, although they performed worse than HC participants, 
committing more errors than HC participants in answering the 
open questions, there was no difference across the different condi-
tions. While such result disagrees with that of previous studies 
showing ToM difficulty with paradigms involving irony or sarcasm 
understanding (17–21), it is consistent with the study of Varga et al. 
(53) and with the results of Rapp et al. (54) finding relatively good 
performances (85% of correct responses) in SZ.
Surprisingly, while we expected the same performances for 
irony rating and mockery rating, since both scales are supposed 
to measure attribution of mental states, the results showed that, 
in contrast to HC participants, SZ patients judged the extent to 
which the speaker was mocking in the same way whatever the four 
conditions. Finally, SZ participants did not show any difficulty 
regarding social perception according to politeness rating in the 
present study.
influence of the Knowledge of social 
stereotypes on ToM ability
The main results of the present study concur with previous findings 
in healthy individuals, showing that ironic statements uttered by a 
speaker with a sarcastic occupation are better understood as ironic 
and judged as more mocking than ironic statements uttered by 
a speaker with a non-sarcastic occupation (44). In other words, 
this means that the knowledge of social stereotypes, such as the 
speaker’s occupation, influences the extent to which we attribute 
ironic intent. In the present study, like HC participants, SZ patients 
seemed also sensitive to such social knowledge, showing different 
performances according to the speaker occupation. This result is 
in line with those of previous studies showing such sensitivity to 
contextual information (21, 30, 32, 36, 53). More specifically, Varga 
et al. (53) found that a linguistic help inserted into the context 
improves the SZ patients’ ability to understand irony. Indeed, SZ 
patients performed as well as HC participants when a word cueing 
irony (e.g., Sarah furiously remarks: “You did a pretty haircut” 
meaning “you did an ugly haircut”) was added in the context, while 
they performed worse than the HC participants when the stimuli 
did not contain such linguistic help. In the present research, SZ 
participants were also able to use social contextual information to 
attribute ironic intent to the speakers in the stories. Thus, social 
knowledge, such as speaker occupation stereotypes, seemed to help 
them in understanding speaker ironic intent, probably because ste-
reotypes are social knowledge that is automatically activated. They 
do not require inferences. Sarcastic occupations are associated to 
specific characteristics (e.g., speaker’s tendencies to be humorous, 
critical, insincere, and to have lower levels of education), which are 
activated automatically without any inference when the participant 
thinks of the occupation. Such occupation stereotypes contribute 
to the ironic environment (44).
This is also probably the reason why our result disagrees 
with those of Corrigan and Penn and colleagues showing that 
SZ participants had specific impairment in recognizing and in 
using abstract social knowledge requiring inferences from the 
social situation (41). Contrary to the abstract social knowledge 
tested by these authors, stereotypes are social knowledge that 
does not require inference. In addition, following the results of 
Hirschfeld et al. (47), such social knowledge would be acquired 
and used outside any social engagement, in contrast to the abstract 
knowledge tested by Corrigan and Nelson (41). For these reasons 
(automaticity and apart from social engagement), SZ participants 
would be able to attribute ironic intent depending on the speaker 
occupation stereotypes.
The case of Mockery rating
Surprisingly here, by contrast with irony rating, SZ patients rated 
the extent to which the speaker was mocking someone or not in the 
same way (around 4), the statement being ironic or literal and 
the speaker occupation being sarcastic or not. To our knowledge, 
no research has investigated how SZ patients understand or feel 
mockery. Our result is probably to be linked with research on 
emotion recognition and emotion judgment by SZ patients since 
irony is used to express negative emotion (55). There is a general 
consensus in the literature on SZ processing of emotion, report-
ing that SZ participants have more difficulties in recognizing and 
judging the negative emotions than the positive ones (56). In these 
studies, SZ participants had to attribute an emotional state to a 
face, for example, while in our study, participants had to attribute 
negative attitude and emotion to the speaker. The attribution of 
a negative attitude to the speaker is probably more explicit in the 
case of mockery rating than in the case of irony rating, as it is the 
case when SZ participants are asked to judge emotions of a face. 
This hypothesis would account for the bad performance of SZ 
participants when they had to judge mockery while they succeeded 
in judging irony.
In addition, research has also shown that SZ patients with 
positive symptoms exhibited this specific impairment regarding 
negative emotion (57). However, our data do not support this spe-
cific profile since we did not find any correlation between mockery 
rating and the positive symptoms measured with the PANSS.
social Perception using Politeness rating
Social perception was assessed through the recognition of polite-
ness. Participants were asking to rate the extent to which the 
speaker of the story was saying something polite or not. To our 
knowledge, none of the tests previously used to investigate social 
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perception in SZ assessed politeness perception. The main results 
showed that SZ patients and HC participants rated politeness in 
the same way. Indeed, they rated the ironic statements as more 
polite than the literal ones. And statements uttered by a speaker 
with a non-sarcastic occupation were rated as more polite than 
statements uttered by a speaker with a sarcastic occupation. These 
results confirm those of Pexman and Olineck (44) and suggest 
that SZ patients did not have difficulties with social perception.
Although politeness is part of the rules that govern social situa-
tions referring to abstract social cues as defined by Corrigan et al. 
(40), it was correctly identified by the SZ patients in our study. 
Such finding diverges from the results of some of the studies by 
Corrigan and colleagues (39, 43). However, it is consistent with 
the result obtained by Corrigan et al. (40) showing that, in contrast 
to SZ inpatients, SZ outpatients are able to correctly identify both 
abstract and concrete cues. Indeed, our study only included outpa-
tients. Such absence of failure may be due to symptom remission, 
as suggested by Corrigan et al. (40). Given that an effect of the 
speaker occupation was also found in both SZ and HC group, it is 
also possible that speaker occupation stereotypes help SZ patients 
to rate politeness.
In conclusion, the present study showed that individuals with 
SZ may be able to attribute mental states, such as speaker ironic 
intent, to a protagonist while they find it difficult to explicitly 
judge and attribute negative attitude, as evidenced by mockery 
rating. These findings provide a meaningful argument that the 
ability to attribute intention to others varies as a function of 
contextual information processing in SZ. While SZ patients fail 
to integrate non-social contextual information to attribute ironic 
intent (21), this attribution may be facilitated by social contextual 
information, such as stereotypes, whose distinctive feature is that 
they are automatically activated. We have to notice that social 
context information and particularly stereotypes on the speaker’s 
occupation concerns “the others” rather than “the other” as an 
individual. Thus, during an in-live communication, if a SZ patient 
knows that that the interlocutor has this or that occupation it may 
cue the attribution of ironic intent to his/her interlocutor. But other 
kind of contextual information, such as information on his/her 
interlocutor as a specific individual, will not be integrated leading 
to disturbance in the interaction.
Results of the present study have important consequences 
in terms of cognitive remediation since ToM ability could have 
an impact on social functioning in SZ (1, 3). The integration of 
contextual information seems to be a good target for cognitive 
remediation aiming to increase the social cognition ability.
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